ALLIANZ POLITIK IN DER SUEZKRISE 1956

The problem of NATO's crisis during the Suez crisis in 1956 (military intervention of Britain, France and Israel to prevent the strengthening of Egypt in the Suez Canal zone) is analyzed in the paper.
The author examines the position of the leading NATO countries – Britain, France and the USA – in the conflict, circumstances of involvement of Israel in the war, influence of the Soviet Union’s position and the Warsaw pact, and the possibility of using of nuclear weapons.
Special attention is paid to the danger of disintegration within NATO. The author ascertains reasons for the negative attitude of the USA to the military operation in the Middle East and their refusal to join the regional alliance under British leadership («the Baghdad Pact»). The USA position in the Suez crisis was conditioned by fear that as a result of the war the Middle East will be engulfed by anti-Western protests and it’ll be in the hands of the Soviet Union. Washington offered a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and London and Paris sought to involve the USA in this intervention. The United States were able to ensure that NATO had not played any significant role up to the highest point of the crisis. «Dialogue of deaf-mutes» during the crisis escalated in heavy quarrel between the United States, Britain and France during the war. President Eisenhower had unwittingly set NATO on the brink of collapse. However, all this was passing behind the scenes, and the public did not notice that during the Suez crisis, NATO experienced one of the worst crises of the Cold War.

1. Die Ausführungen basieren auf den Forschungsergebnissen meiner Dissertation. Vgl. Thomas Freiberger, Allianzpolitik in der Suezkrise, Göttingen 2013 Internationale Beziehungen. Theorie und Geschichte, Bd. 11.

2. Siehe dazu ausführlich Kapitel I, in: Thomas Freiberger, Allianzpolitik in der Suezkrise, Göttingen 2013, Internationale Beziehungen. Theorie und Geschichte, Bd. 11.

3. Oscar Wilde, Lord Arthur Saviles Verbrechen. Eine Studie über Pflicht, in: Ders., Erzählungen und Prosagedichte, 2., neu durchg. Aufl., Zürich, 1999.

4. The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Vol. XI, Doc. 1050, Eisenhower to Hazlett, 1.11.1950.

5. David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled. British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century, London, New York 1991.

6. Siehe dazu ausführlich Kapitel II, in: Thomas Freiberger, Allianzpolitik in der Suezkrise, Göttingen 2013, Internationale Beziehungen. Theorie und Geschichte, Bd. 11.

7. The National Archives (Kew) PREM 11/1099, E.C. (56) 10, 7.8.1956, Cabinet Egypt Committee. France and the Middle East. Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Der Entwurf der Anweisung findet sich in PRO FO371/119090, JE 14211/370/G, FO Minute Beeley, 8.8.1956.

8. Zum „Alliance Security Dilemma“ siehe Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, Ithaca, London 1997.

9. Zu den Begriffen siehe Paul W. Schroeder, Alliances 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management, in: Klaus Knorr (Hg.), Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, Lawrence 1976.

10. Siehe dazu ausführlich Kapitel III, in: Thomas Freiberger, Allianzpolitik in der Suezkrise, Göttingen 2013, Internationale Beziehungen. Theorie und Geschichte, Bd. 11.

11. The National Archives (Kew) PREM 11/2189, AU 1051/53, The Present State of Anglo-United Relations, 1.1.1957.