«WHEN THE STATE POWER BECAME... LOW». CRISIS AND FALL OF THE DA LIAO “DUAL EMPIRE”

Abstract

The paper deals with the main causes of the Khitan Liao Empire crisis and fall in the late 11th– early 12thcenturies. The research is based on a complex analysis of the factors determining the “dual” empire institutions vitality lowering. The article shows that the second cycle of crisis events (the Empire’s development recession) in the late 11th– early 12thcenturies turned to be deeper, and the protection mechanisms which saved the Empire in the late 10thcentury didn't work any more. The demonstrative markers of the crisis were invasions termination and weakening of the army, loss of unity in the emperor’s environment, constant internicine quarrelling, elites isolation, absence of access to the high posts for talented councillors and military commandos, desocialization of nomads etc. It should be noted that among the last Liao governors there was no charismatic leader who could unite the Liao society to resolve the actual foreign policy issues. However, the most important marker was the absence of an innovative development program of the Empire similar to the aspirations of Khitan leaders Taizu and Shengzong. In contrast to many nomadic Middle Age empires, Khitans overcame the complexity threshold which was the long existence of the State structures and system of exploitation of the sedentary population resources. Nevertheless, such transformation ruined the “nomadic nature’ of the Empire, i. e. military and political basis of the dual empire. Numerous but capable Liao army couldn't stand against the Jurchens army, less numerous but consolidated by Aguda, which predetermined the Empire fall.